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4ABSTRACT
The arrival of modernity not only constituted communities but
also impelled them in competition against each other in Kerala. Modern
politics of the state as a result is inextricably liked with intense
community politics. The success of community politics for rights and
resources varied across communities, so also strategies of assertion. This
paper will focus on different instances of community assertions by the
Syrian Christians in twentieth century Travancore/Kerala. The
confrontation of the community with the Hindu state and the then Dewan
in the 1930s, the ‘Liberation Struggle’ against the Communists during
late 1950s and the anti-eviction movements of 1960s testifies to its lack
of primordial adherences and openness to heterogeneous strategies as
required by different historical circumstances. It moves freely from
secular to non-secular, minoritarian to majoritarian and lawful to
unlawful, with claims to a greater citizenship. The hegemonic
developmentalist ideology to which the community subscribes, along
with reiteration of a righteous and industrious citizenship, ensured the
transformation of the ‘unlawful’ into ‘lawful’. Using even ‘state
secularism’ in Travancore of the 1940s  as a route of sectarianism, Syrian
Christian politics resorted to no permanent self-representation, resulting
in unfixed community constellations. The paper also suggests that the
recent recourse of the community to minority rights may hint at an
internal crisis and a loss of moral weight it possessed earlier.
Keywords: Syrian Christian, community, minority, secularism,
communalism, communitarianism, citizenship,
developmentalism.
5Introduction
It was a hot day sometime in the 1930s and Tharitathu
Kunjithomman, who represented the Syrian Christian
community in the Sree Mulam Praja Sabha of
Travancore, could not help dozing off. He woke up with a
start, however, when the matter of importing two giraffes
for the Thiruvananthapuram zoo was being discussed.
He didn’t really catch what was going on except that it
had something to do with filling places in a public
institution. Now, this meant that there was no time to
lose. Up he jumped, demanding in uncertain terms that
“one of them should be a Syrian Christian”!
Thus goes the local folklore about the Syrian Christian zeal
about claiming space in the institutional machinery of government.
Hostile storytellers sometimes replace the giraffes with donkeys, but no
one today can deny the success of Syrian Christian community politics
in Kerala. One of the key elements that gave Kerala the reputation of
being a ‘problem state’ within the Indian Union in the second half of the
20th century was undoubtedly the preponderance of community
maneuvering in its political field. This was particularly true of the
southern region that corresponded to the erstwhile princely state of
Travancore: indeed, among the Malayalam-speaking areas, Travancore
6had acquired such a reputation for politics defined by community-
competition that in the early years of Independence, avowed nationalists
in Malabar, like K Kelappan, viewed the prospect of United Kerala with
some trepidation, fearing that the ‘communal canker’ would spread to
Malabar.1
Scholars have been deeply divided on the significance of the
powerful presence of organized communities in politics. For some, it
defines Kerala’s politics as rather ‘sub-modern’ and fundamentally
inimical to transparent democratic processes – the argument, often, is
that Kerala’s politics should be understood as the extension of religion
and caste into the public domain, and thoroughly modern forms of
mobilization, such as that of the communists, succumbed to it sooner or
later (Hardgrave 1965, Fic 1970, Gopakumar 1986). Some have accused
it of being the prime reason for political instability (Gopakumar 1986).
In contrast, others have been markedly optimistic, suggesting that that
organized communities have competed with each other largely around
resources and most often within the terms of democratic politics. This,
they point out, has helped to create a fairer distribution of social and
economic resources among communities, and to a large extent, mitigate
communal hatred such that outright violence between communities has
been relatively less in Kerala compared to other parts of India (Jeffrey
2003, Mathew 1989, Thomas 1985, Nampoothiri 1999, Kooiman 1989,
Chiriyankandath 1993).2 These studies have argued that for these
reasons, ‘community politics’ in Kerala should not be lumped with
1 Reported in Deepika,  Oct.31 1949, p. 3.
2 Though many argue that caste and community affiliations have become
more influential in recent times. See Isaac and Tharakan 1995.
7‘religious nationalism’ (Van der Meer 1994) or ‘communalism’.3   A
third view has stressed that such formations arose from the fact that
caste- and class-divisions in Kerala have often coincided – and that
communist and nationalist engagements with community politics have
often been driven by perceptions of such coincidence and distance (Karat
1970, Menon 1994, Nossiter 1982). In general, there is agreement that
in the early and mid 20th century Malayalee society, ‘communalism’
referred not to fierce hatred and violence between communities, but to
intense competition around rights and resources within the field of
modern politics and centred upon the state.
But the later half of the 20th century offers a different picture.
Several events since the 1980s – from the controversy over the alleged
violation of the sacred geography of the Sabarimala temple by the
Christians [known as the Nilakkal controversy (1981)] and the furore
over the alleged desecration of the New Testament in the controversial
play Kristuvinte Aaraamtirumurivu (1984) to the recent outbreak of
communal violence at Marad in north Kerala – indicate that the nature
of communal politics may be changing.4 This period coincides with the
3 The working definition of ‘communalism’ here is politics that is built upon
religious sentiments, identities, and claims, which assume internal
homogeneity and external uniqueness of the religious identity, which works
to exclude other faiths and cultivate animosity towards them. Menon (2006)
explains the difference of South India in this regard from the North in terms
of the spread of liberal education through Christian missionaries, anti-
Brahmin mobilizations and the Dravidian movement, large-scale conversion
to  Christianity and Hindu reformist movements led by the lower castes.
4 There are scholars who explain this as a transition from the ‘communitarian
to the communal’. According to K.N Panikkar the violent incident at Marad
indicates that communalism has crossing a stage of proto-communalism,
which had a long period of incubation (Panikkar 2003). There are others
who feel that it is difficult to mark a line between communitarianism and
communalism in the context of Kerala. Sarada Muraleedharan, the Director
of Kudumbashree programme of the Kerala government, for instance, has
recently expressed concern over the increasing tendency of communal
polarization in the neighborhood groups and Kudumbashree units, blurring
the  distinction between the communitarian and the communal (http://signoff-
shahina.blogspot.com/2008/08/enigma-of-empowered-women-kerala.html).
8rise of Hindu politics in Kerala – the BJP and the Sangh Parivar, which
appeared in the electoral scene in the mid-1980s, though with minimal
gains (Suresh 1988: 195). Nevertheless it may be not only interesting
but also rewarding to revisit the early and mid 20th century decades and
inquire about Syrian Christian community assertions which defended
and extended the community’s access to rights and resources – to gain
some understanding of the strategies deployed which produced state
responses that favoured the protection of community interest.
But before, it may be important to be aware of the limits of
communalizing imperatives, even of the above form. What we have
seen in Kerala did certainly work, for a long period, to deflect group
rivalries away from violent and hate-generating forms of contest.
However, this did not mean that rivalries have ended or even lessened;
nor does this mean that greater mutual understanding between
communities has risen substantially. Scholarship on community politics
in Kerala, with its endless reiteration of the goals, self-projections, and self-
definitions of communities, has been complicit in the reproduction of such
rivalries. This is most evident in the manner in which in much of the
existing literature on community politics in Kerala, historical analysis
is often implicitly elided through the presentation of a teleological
narrative of the community as a collective historical subject-agent.
The story of the modernizing community, then, is one of ‘birth’
sometime in the late 19th – early 20th century decades as a result of the
weakening of vertical social ties and the emergence of economic class
distinctions which followed colonial penetration of local society and
economy, ‘taking shape’ through internal reform and homogenization
efforts, and progress in time through the acquisitions of rights and resources
with varying degrees of success in competition with other communities/
sub-communities and political movements in the expanding field of
modern politics. By reproducing dominant representations of community-
9building, social science scholarship naturalizes its external boundaries, if
not its internal hierarchies. That scholarship appears to be content with
this limit to thinking may be explainable. Though the competitive politics
of mutually-exclusive communities in Kerala has not really resolved
conflict but rather suppressed it, liberal scholars heave a sigh of relief at
the sight of a liberal island amidst what appears to be the veritable sea of
illiberalism that is South Asia.
However, the important task of critical scholarship would be to
retrieve these not as homogenizing or homogenized communities but
as non-homogenous traditions of rationality and difference. In other
words, such teleological narratives obscures the fact that far from being
merely a ‘community’, Syrian Christians and Mappila Muslims of Kerala
are ‘historical traditions’ accrued around a core of ideas and imbued
with distinct rationality, but are neither completely homogenous nor
incapable of conversation and borrowing from other such traditions –
this is inspired, of course by Alasdair McIntyre’s reflections on ‘tradition-
constituted enquiry’ (McIntyre 1984). Sadly enough even critical
scholarship continues to reproduce the self-representations of the
communalizing initiatives (undoubtedly powerful in the 20th century)
within these historical traditions of difference, making the former stand
in place of the latter.
This paper, however, has a far more modest aim.In this essay, we
hope to question the homogeneity attributed to ‘community assertion’
through the analysis of different instances of Syrian Christian
community assertion in 20th century Travancore/Kerala. Certainly, in
Travancore too, many of the processes initiated through and in colonial
rule – the census, and the constitutional reforms — did set in motion the
transformation of a moral-political-economic caste order into an order
in which communities, which projected themselves as mutually exclusive
and internally homogenous, began to compete for resources
(Chiriyankandath  1993). There were other factors as well, such as the
10
opening up of a new modernizing domain in which the modern nation
of Travancore was consecrated.
 However, the strategies of community assertion in moments of
conflict were not simply and repetitively around religious identity and
uniqueness. They are neither homogenous nor fired by the same kinds of
strategies or ideologies. Neither was there any stable relation of opposition
to the ‘secular’ as it appeared in the pre-independence Hindu kingdom of
Travancore and in the post-independence context. Thus it may be
necessary to examine the constitutive historical contexts which supply
the specific elements that make up specific instances of community
assertion. Our focus, then, is the process of primordialising/naturalizing
the community through avowed performances over time, with different
strategies, under different historico-political circumstances, to specific
ends; community, then, appears as an unfixed, non-static constellation,
which travels through times with inventions, deletions and renewals. It is
our contention that any deliberate effort to actualize secularism as
‘principled distance’ needs to take this into account, as communities will
have their own ‘contextual reasoning’ under different circumstances.
The Syrian Christian community has been widely recognized to
have made sizeable gains through community competition in 20th
century Kerala. They trace their origins back to the first century AD, to
the story of the evangelization of the Apostle St. Thomas in India, which
is firmly entrenched in faith. The Syrian Christians are distinguished
from the Latin Christians, supposedly converted by the Portuguese, and
described themselves as ‘Nazranis’ or ‘St. Thomas Christians’, till the
advent of the Dutch. The Syrian liturgy that was being followed by the
community due to their ecclesiastical commune with the East Syrian
Patriarchate made the Dutch missionaries to distinguish them as ‘Syrian
Christian’ as different from the ‘other’ Christians who adhered to the
Latin liturgy. The nerve centre of the Syrian Christians is in south and
central Kerala; their migration to Malabar is relatively recent. Before
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colonialism, they were prominent in mercantile activities, soldiering,
and agriculture and said to have enjoyed high-caste status close to the
Nairs. They also were closely integrated with the traditional brahmin-
centred order of caste,5 but without losing their difference as Nazranis
(Bayly 1984). Their history under colonialism is one of resistance to
Latinisation, and fragmentation into several distinct denominations,
including the Syro-Malabar, the Orthodox-syrian, the Malankara Syrian,
the Syrian-orthodox, the Marthoma, and others (Varghese 2006: 172-
83). In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, the Syrian Christian
community – especially Syrian Catholics — emerged as Kerala’s most
‘advanced’ community, as a recent effort to compare the socio-economic
profiles6 of Kerala’s major communities revealed (Zachariah 2006: 197;
for a historical account, Jeffrey 1976, Baak 1997). They are at present a
substantial minority, a powerful presence in all fields of life in Kerala.
Their successful survival against Hindu chauvinism in early 20th century
Travancore state is often held up as evidence for Kerala’s exceptionalism
vis-à-vis the rest of India – of the ‘communal road to a secular Kerala’, as
the title of an important study puts it.
I
From the early 19th century, political modernization proceeded in
Travancore through a series of moves and counter-moves between the
British colonizer and the ‘Hindu State’ of Travancore. By the ‘treaty of
perpetual friendship and alliance’ forced upon Travancore by the British,
political power passed effectively into the hands of the British Resident
initially, and later, to the Dewans formally appointed by the Raja but
always with British assent. The sole concern of the Travancore king, as
voiced by the Rani placed on the throne of Travancore by the British after
5 Muraleedharan (1996) argues that the category ‘Hindu’ can scarcely be
used to make sense of the pre-colonial order of caste in Kerala.
6 Constructed from the specific demographic profile, migration patterns,
control over resources, housing and other amenities, and ownership of
consumer durables.
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the suppression of the revolt led by Velu Thampi, apparently, was that the
kingdom should continue to be ruled according to mammool (customary
usage) – that is, rule should continue to reproduce the brahminical caste
order of which the ‘Hindu State’ of Travancore was the self-appointed
guardian. The kingdom escaped annexation probably because of this
firmly established ‘Hindu’ legacy. Indeed, Travancore’s claims to being a
‘true’ and ‘unsullied’ Hindu State had been built up from the times of
Marthanda Varma, the founder of  the kingdom of Travancore, through
elaborate performance of public rituals, institution of charities, and other
means, all of which continued to be evoked to produce ritual authority in
the 19th century as well (Kawashima 1998: 16-25). In the mid-19th century,
then, Travancore was the scene of a tussle between the British and the
‘Hindu State’, the former seeking to extend political control and extractive
power over the region and the latter seeking to both placate the former
and refurbish its legitimacy in local society.
In the early-mid decades of the 19th century, Travancore underwent
extensive reform – a systematic hollowing of the crown — under the
supervision of the British Residents. At the same time, despite initial
reluctance, Travancore’s state policy opened up its economy to British
interests, encouraging a new agro-economy that encouraged monoculture
of commercial crops. Plentiful concessions began to be offered to
European planters, especially with the coming of the modernizing
Dewan, T. Madhava Rao (Raviraman 1997: 36; Kooiman 1989: 120;
Baak 1997: 61-137; Pillai 1940/1995: 475-87). The political and
economic autonomy of the kingship was clearly waning.
In pre-British Travancore and later too, the temporal authority could
and did intervene in the affairs of caste groups within the framework of
mamool.  For instance, in 1822-23, Rani Parvati Bai of Travancore issued
a proclamation regulating dowry payments among Malayala brahmins in
Travancore, and ordering that all unmarried women above the age of 14
of these groups must be married without delay, pointing out that the
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increasing burden of dowry was leading to the alienation of brahmin
lands and causing distress to women (Nair and Pushpa 1992: 181-2).
However such authority was not easy to wield anymore, as was evident in
the course of the ‘Breast Cloth’ struggle in mid-19th century Travancore.
In a series of intense challenges, lower caste converts to Christianity,
supported by LMS missionaries (concerned, however, much more about
new virtues like modesty), sought to defy dress codes that justified the
established hierarchy of caste (Jeffrey 1976,  Yesudas 1975). In this case,
the Travancore ruler had to formulate a solution that would answer the
missionaries’ cry for modesty and ‘civilization’, but would not offend the
established caste hierarchy (Jeffrey 1976: 57-67).
The ‘Hindu State’ attempted to refurbish its traditional sources of
legitimacy through the deployment of the modernized version of its
(Hindu) self-description as Dharmaraajyam or the ‘Land of Charity’–
and this inevitably involved the expansion of strategies of government
and promotion of techniques of the self rooted in the political and
economic imperatives of the modern state. A network of modern schools
and hospitals were opened in Travancore under state aegis and generous
encouragement was provided to local communities, missionaries, and
individuals to come forward to initiate such ventures (Jeffrey 2003).
Missionary schools began to admit lower caste pupils and began to be
eagerly sought out by people lower in the caste hierarchy, and by the
1930s, they had established a wide network of primary schools
throughout the State. Simultaneously, a class of peasant proprietors –
potential ‘industrious producers’ – were created through tenancy reform,
prominently the Pattom Proclamation of 1865, which created a new
market society based on individual rights on the soil (Varghese 1970).
The nascent public sphere that emerged in this period was largely
perceived to be fulfilling the pedagogic function of shaping ideal
industrious subjects for the nation.
In this new domain thus opened up in which the Hindu State could
renew its legitimacy– that of the ‘modern nation’ assumed to be in the
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making, promising a unified community animated by ‘love’ and ‘care’ in
the future — a new relation came to be posited between the state and the
citizen. Individual citizens are not simply born into modern nations; they
must fashion themselves as ‘industrious subjects’, as contributors of wealth
and well-being, to claim citizenship for themselves. In turn, the state
bestows benevolent care on citizens, creating ideal conditions for their
functioning as hardworking and obedient subjects. The citizen’s ‘positive
link’ to the modern nation, however, involved more than finding adequate
subsistence for oneself. It involves, rather, the effort to improve the
condition of immediate fellow-beings – in one’s family, social group, and
economic network. The space for individual prosperity, it was argued,
could well accommodate a sense of duty to the nation in defining the
traits of this newly construed citizenship.   At the heart of all imagined
collectivities laying claim to the ‘modern’ at the end of the 19th century in
Travancore lay this appeal for ‘positive ties’.
This version of developmentalism deeply informed the attempts
of modern-educated elites of powerful caste groups to transform their
caste identities into community identities – and the Syrian Christians
were prominent among these — advanced their claims as loyal,
industrious wealth producers. ‘Community’ in late 19th century
Travancore, then, was no simple reassertion of primordial ties or defined
by an insulated inner space.7 It was imagined as taking shape in the
7 This is particularly evident when we consider the refashioning of the domestic
among the Syrian Christian community through legal measures to regulate
inheritance and property rights of women, through the Travancore Christian
Succession Act in 1916.  Sure, the rhetoric of disapproval over the adoption
of a more liberal provision for women was around how it would lead to the
‘destruction of the community’ but it appears evident that this was no
defense of a sanctified and inviolable ‘inner space’, but the active creation
of one that would be in step with the project of ‘industry and enterprise’
opened up in the late 19th century. Kodoth (2002) points out that the
underpinnings of the reaffirmation of patriarchy through this iniquitous
law were institutional rather than structural or canonical. Since then,
however, the ‘inner space’ has been hotly defended, most recently in the
context of the Mary Roy Case in the late 1980s (Phillips 2003).
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future and deeply informed by the logic of this specific late 19th century
developmentalism,8 often projected into the constructed vision of the
community’s hallowed past – of how the Syrian Christians were
welcomed into Kerala as productive subjects.9
What was interesting about this imagined national community
constructed in the emergent Malayalam public sphere was that it did
not nullify or override the presence of the modernizing caste community:
one could well be a believer of a specific faith, member of a particular
caste-community, and a patriotic-industrious producer-citizen, all
together. The shaping up of the common linguistic identity around
modern Malayalam, too, did not demand such homogenization, as G
Arunima has recently argued — the new public realm that emerged in
late 19th-early 20th century Kerala was not “..a purely ‘secular’ one,
where secularization implied a rupture with faith.” (Arunima 2006: 74).
Syrian Christian efforts to build up a community-modernizing apparatus
began with a network of modern schools, which drew upon liberal grant-
in-aid from the state – and no contradiction was perceived.  Nor was the
mediation of the missionaries perceived to be a problem. Even though
tensions between Syrian Christians and Nairs were reported since the
1880s onwards, missionary schools were sought out by both communities
since they were perceived to be efficiently run, despite the fact that
8 The collapse of the native state including its demilitarisation and a British
dominated commercial system heaved the community out of their
traditional economic niches and it had to recreate itself (Bayly 1989:
282-90).
9 Several modern historians have concurred with this view. See Varier 1981;
Narayanan 2006.  However, it appears that the Latin Catholics could not
claim such a relation – precisely because they were raising challenged to
the established brahminical caste-order. Latin proselytisation, some authors,
claim, began since the 13th century, and faced opposition from the ‘Hindu’
kings because of this. The Kolathiri of Malabar , they argue, wrote to the
King of Portugal in 1507 asking him to stop conversions of Tiyyas and
the Mukkuva fisherfolk, since it irritates the Nairs and deprives them of
income. See John 1981: 347-54.
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these schools did have compulsory Bible-sessions. Both official accounts
and community-histories of these times reflect on such overlap, evoking
a timeless history of tolerance and consideration of the ‘Hindu State’
towards its subjects of different religious persuasions. The Syrian
Christians proudly cited a long history of being ‘industrious subjects’
of Hindu kings and of being rewarded for their hard work and law-
abiding nature.  Writing of the conferment of ‘seventy-two honours’ to
the Christian merchant by the Chera king of Cranganore, the historian
T.K. Joseph (1923/1981) commented, “[E]vidently the Chera King found
the Christians a very valuable commercial asset” (p. 331). However, as
Syrian Christians prospered with the opening up of Travancore’s
economy in the late 19th century, they began to feel that these ‘ancient
tradition’ were strained.
In the tense years of the 1930s, Syrian Christian spokesmen would
indignantly condemn the Travancore state’s alleged abandonment of
such traditional generosity and what they perceived to be the
abandonment of a relationship of mutual benefit.The loss of benevolence
and partisanship of the Hindu state was not really sudden. In Malayala
Manorama, Kandathil Varghese Mappila expressed his resentment
against the Travancore’s government’s regulations on constructing new
churches. He recollects the earlier system wherein the subjects and the
king shared “hearty mutual dependence and warmth,” informing the
king was just a formality, only to generate financial support from the
king for constructing the church (‘Thiruvithamkotte Christianikal
Anubhavikkunna Oru Sankatam’, Editorial, Malayala Manorama, 28
October 1893, in Mappila 1997).  Two years later Mappila again
criticized the Travancore government in discriminating Christians
against Hindus in the question of sanctioning government schools for
girls (‘Thiruvithamkotte Hindukkalum Christianikalum Thammilulla
Bhetham’, 5 October 1895, in Mappila 1997). This sentiment intensified
in the 1930s, and one such author lamenting the loss of a past in which
“we find them [Syrian Christians] a homogenous social unit in the
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national polity of Travancore, not merely important in numerical strength,
but enjoying a social prestige only accorded to the Hindus of the
highest caste…Travancore, my home-land, which for centuries had
set an example of a national unity, a sustained spirit of mutual goodwill
and forbearance among citizens, such as no other part of India has
been able to attain to, was now in the throes of a bitter strife” (Matthen
1935: 14, 26).  This framework, which assumed a certain non-existent
equivalence between differently-endowed communities, however, was
clearly one that favoured the powerful communities to the disadvantage
of others.
While the equivalence between membership in the nation and
membership in distinct faiths/communities continued to be actively
constructed in the emergent public sphere, claimed, especially, by
communities disadvantaged in the hierarchical order of caste, there were
clear structural and ideological hurdles in the way of its actualization.
The Travancore kingdom relied heavily on upper caste elites, with its
self-projection as ‘Hindu’. This is something that was well internalized
by other religious communities like the Christians. For instance,
Kandathil Varghese Mappila describes Travancore as a state with “Hindu
government under which all religious communities supposed to have
no unfreedom.” Mappila was concerned for the fact that the established
principle has not been followed at times (‘Thiruvithamkotte Christianikal
Anubhavikkunna Oru Sankatam’, Editorial, Malayala Manorama, 28
October 1893, in Mappila 1997).   This became especially evident with
the formation of legislative bodies and modern civil social forums (such
as the ‘citizens’ assemblies convened in local towns to fete the Maharaja
on special occasions such as his birthday), where upper caste dominance
was assumed. Chiriyankandanth (1993: 650) mentions how the
perceived denial of this ‘natural right’ of the Nairs as ‘Hindus’ in the
‘Hindu State’ (elected chairs of a series of such meetings were all
Christian) in the 1913 provoked the founder of the Nair community
movement into starting the Nair Service Society. Electoral politics made
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this bias apparent, and it kept Christians, Muslims, and lower caste-
communities out of key areas in the administration, and disallowed
proportional representation to these groups in Travancore’s legislative
bodies, even in the 1920s, when the Christians and Ezhavas had proved
themselves to be ‘industrious subjects’ beyond all doubt, actively
entering the plantation sector and commercial banking (Kooiman 1995:
19). Secondly, over the 19th- and early 20th centuries, tensions between
Christians and Nairs in Travancore had risen (Jeffrey 1976); adding to
these were the echoes of the Mappila Rebellion in Malabar in the
early 1920s. In 1921, at the height of the violence of the revolt, Hindu
students boycotted the compulsory scriptural classes at the Church
Missionary Society College at Kottayam in protest, and the view that
government-aided institutions should not conduct Bible-reading
sessions became stronger  (Jeffrey 2003: 63). ‘Secularism’, thus, made
its  entrance as a violation of the imagined political framework of
tolerance and encouragement of all faiths and a reassertion of the
Hindu State’s determination to foster a Hindu-centric order – a point
to be raised innumerable times in Syrian Christian polemics against
Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyer in the 1930s and 40s. Syrian Christian
belligerence was frequently directed against the violation of the
‘positive link’ that ostensibly bound the state and the industrious
citizen in nation-building, which had not required the renunciation of
community identities and, indeed, was credited with a long and
respectable history.
In the 1930s, such tensions grew to bursting point, with a full-
fledged confrontation between the Syrian Christians elites and the
Dewan, who defended ‘Hindu’ interests, also defended by upper-caste
Nairs. The 1931 Census set the alarm bells ringing among the high caste
‘Hindus’. The ‘Hindu’ population seemed to have declined from 69.9
per cent of the total in 1901 to 61.6 per cent in 1931 – which was below
the Indian average of 68.2 per cent. The Christian population, however,
had increased from 23.6 per cent to 31.5 per cent between 1901 and
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1931(Kooiman 1995 : 17). Conversions did happen,10 however the chief
reason for the rise in Christian numbers was the very ‘flourishing’ of the
community – through high fertility, enabled by the spell of prosperity
in early 20th century (Kooiman 1995 : 17).11 The Travancore State
Manual of 1940, drafted by T. K. Velu Pillai, a leading Nair intellectual
close to palace circles noted the rise of Syrian Christian population with
almost a sense of anguish – from 4.6 per cent in the 1820s to 31.5 per
cent in 1931.
‘Hindu’ anxieties hardened in the 1930s, manifested in C P
Ramaswamy Aiyer’s blatant favouritism towards the Nairs,  promotion
of Hinduism, and animosity towards Christians (though he did make
some attempts to divide them by favouring some groups), and hostility
towards attempts to promote Nair-Syrian Christian amity. The Nair elite
assisted him.12   Besides resisting Ezhava, Muslim, and Syrian Christian
10 For instance the Census reports of Travancore for 1931 and 1941 show
that on  the coast, the efforts of the educated members of the elite Araya
community to create a coastal Hindu group had met with moderate success,
however, the lower caste groups also converted in large numbers to
Christianity, as both reports reveal (Census 1931: 384; Census 1941:132)
11 They had also acquired considerable amounts of land from Nairs, with
Nair joint families disintegrating after the Nair Bill sanctioning partition
of joint family properties in the mid-20s, and later, from European planters
abandoning land in the wake of the Great Depression (Varghese 2006:
67). After nationalist outcry blocked the assignment of large chunks of
government land to the Brooke Bond company in the late 1920s, the state
adopted the policy of giving preference to natives in the allocation and
registration of land for plantation (Varghese 2006: 70). The impact of the
Great Depression, however, was hard on the Syrian Christian peasantry,
though, and a major response, as we will see, was migration.
12  Both C.P and the Nair elite accused the Syrian Christians of harboring a
plot to abolish the Hindu dynasty and turn Travancore into a ‘Christian
State’; a Nair conference in 1932 declared that “..the Nairs were the lords
of the soil in Travancore and… and that the Maharaja was the Maharaja of
the Nairs” (Ouwerkerk 1994: 86; Matthen 1951: 26; report of Nair
conference, Nazrani Deepika, 20 Jan 1938).
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demands for proportional representation in legislative bodies (Kooiman
1995: 39-42), Sir CP led a formidable effort to ‘revitalize’ the Hindus
through a range of measures, from the Temple Entry Proclamation,
allegedly to prevent the disgruntled Ezhava elites’ plans to convert, to
his welcoming of the Hindu Mahasabha to reconvert those who have
moved out, to training in Sanskrit and scriptures for priests (Ouwerkerk
1994: 96-99; 171-72). In these, he managed to secure Gandhi’s approval
– and the Congress’s constructive work in Travancore did fit into the
upper caste revitalizing–Hindu project13 (Ouwerkerk 1994: 97; Gandhi
1936/1942).  Gandhi interpreted the Temple Entry Proclamation as an
effort on the part of the Hindu ruler to revise his traditional authority as
regulator of caste groups — as attempting ‘contextual reasoning’ for
intervention within the framework of Hindu mamool, thereby
democratizing the latter and remained partial to the Dewan until quite
late. However, by no stretch of imagination could it be perceived as
remotely connected to secularizing imperatives. The Dewan was
viciously hostile to Syrian Christians and determined to create a new
base of legitimacy for the Hindu state, a unified Hindu community
hegemonized by the upper castes. Ouwerkerk, a direct observer and
participant in the turmoil of the 1930s, recalls that the “favourite term of
abuse used against the Christians and Muslims by the Nair press was the
accusation of ‘rank communalism’ (Ouwerkerk 1994: 90).
The later actions of the Dewan in the 30s and 40s – his repressive
measures against the Joint Political Conference set up by Christian,
13 Interestingly, Gandhi, in the 1920s, had thwarted the efforts of his Syrian
Christian disciple, George Joseph, to frame the struggle against caste at the
Vaikam Satyagraha as a battle for civil rights, for free access to roads
around the temple for all. Gandhi, however, was adamant that this was a
‘religious issue’, and a Hindu one, in which Christians could not be granted
any major role. (Joseph 2003: 164). However, Gandhi’s emissary to
Travancore, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur in 1937, reported to him that the
Dewan was obsessed with anti-Christian sentiment and the party of Nairs
that he set up, the Travancore National Congress, was full of “real
communalists, too communal-minded to want responsible government.”
(quoted in Ouwerkerk 1994: 154).
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Muslim, and Ezhava leaders, and later, against the Travancore State
Congress which demanded responsible government, his alleged role in
the destruction and discrediting of Syrian Christian banks,14 his hostility
towards the International Fellowship that worked to reconcile the
different warring groups, and his unwarranted insistence (since the
Travancore Educational Reforms Committee Report (1945) had not
recommended any such measure) on taking over schools run by
minorities for a ‘secular’ welfare project — the establishment of universal
and compulsory primary education – all came to be interpreted in the
light of his open support of the high caste project of Hindu community-
building.15 His wrath was seen as particularly directed towards the Syrian
Christians (Kooiman 2002, Kusuman 1976, Mappillai 1997, Matthen
1951, Koshy 1976, Mathew 2008).The compromise reached in February
1947 allowed the Christians to keep their schools, but only Christian
students were to be admitted to such schools (Ouwerkerk 1994: 235).
It is however, important to note that the Christian response to
these attacks was not just to assert their religious identity, but draw
upon the discourse of ‘industrious and law-abiding subjects’. Within a
self-identified Hindu kingdom, minorities could claim no formal rights;
14 The Syrian Christians ran most of the banks in Travancore. The Travancore
Bank, the first organized commercial bank in Travancore was started in
1893 under Christian ownership. The Travancore National and Quilon
Bank, owned by two Christian families namely Kandathil and Chalakuzhiyil,
during the late 1930s was ranked first in India in terms of number of
branch offices and third in the total volume of business. Only the Central
Bank of India and the Bank of India exceeded this Travancorean bank in
the volume of business. Sir C.P engineered the liquidation of the bank in
1938 (Ommen 1976)
15 This support is reconfirmed by his (very sympathetic) biographer, who
quotes his speeches in which he argues that Christian prosperity in
Travancore was a result of ‘Hindu largesse’, and offers details of his
efforts to curb Christian religious instruction in government-aided schools
(Sundararajan 2002: 311). Also, CP’s attempts at ‘secularism’ in the 1940s
were widely supported by Hindu communal organizations in Travancore
and elsewhere, but not by the communists in Travancore (Ouwerkerk
1994: 233).
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they could only appeal to the ‘age-old’ moral obligations of the king
towards non-Hindu subjects. The campaign for fair representation was
named the ‘Abstention Movement’ (1934), precisely to distinguish it
from Civil Disobedience, and the Christians emphasized its difference
in the face of the Dewan’s attempt to lump the two together. As C P
Matthen argued, civil disobedience was a struggle against a foreign
ruler; in Travancore, however, it was the “assertion of the rights of one
group of citizens of that portion of these rights of which they had been
unfairly deprived of in order to confer it on another group of citizens in
the same state. The Ruler was not merely the judge, but the trusted
judge, in this claim” (Matthen 1951: 22). Besides, innumerable articles
in newspapers and public speeches lamented the sheer unfairness of the
Dewan’s hostility towards its most hard working and enterprising subjects,
something that was totally against the very essence of Kerala’s ‘ancient
polity’ through the 1930s and 1940s. Things were arguably more or less
the same on the issue of establishing the independent state of Travancore
after the independence. K.M. Mathew remembers that the only condition
Sir. C.P put forward for granting permission to resume Malayala Manorama
was to support the independent state of Travancore. The Dewan threatened
K.M Cheriyan who met him for the permission, if they fail to concede, he
“will see that you are ruined” (Mathew 2008: 229-31).
Indian independence ushered in an altered context – most
importantly, the Indian Constitution, which supported the rights of
religious minorities. However, too many other things remained
unchanged. Most prominent was the upper caste Hindu domination
within the Congress, evident in the hostility that many prominent
Congress leaders displayed towards community politics, much of which
had a distinct Hindu-majoritarian tinge. Secondly, the efforts to form a
unified upper caste hegemonized ‘Hindu community’ were active in the
early 1950s:  the Travancore Dewan had made strenuous effort to create
a united ‘Hindu’ front of Nairs and Ezhava elite (Ezhava working classes
were with the communists; Ouwerkerk 1994:208), and proposals to create
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a ‘Hindu Mahamandalam’ were voiced by the Nair and Ezhava
community movements in the early 50s (Gopakumar 1986). Indeed, it
must be remembered that the Catholics now faced a significantly different
political milieu: of being a really small minority within the hugely-
expanded national context. As Savarkar had hinted in his address to the
Hindu conference held at the Nair Service Society’s annual meeting in
the early 40s, it would be easier for the Hindu majority to check the
Christians within such a national context in which they would be reduced
to a minuscule minority (Ouwerkerk 1994: 171-72). In this new milieu,
efforts to regulate primary education in the early 1950s continued to
look like an anti-Christian conspiracy.
These fears worsened when the communists came into power in
the first elected government of the newly-constituted State of Kerala.
Interestingly, while Hindu organisations were overwhelmingly in favour
of the Dewan’s scheme, communists in Travancore had supported the
Church’s resistance to the Dewan’s attempts to take over schools
(Ouwerkerk 1994 : 233). However, in the post-independence context,
they were formidable adversaries because (a) they could not be directly
accused of majoritarianism (b) they were as committed to
developmentalism and the shaping of ‘industrious citizens’, except that
theirs was an ‘egalitarian developmentalism’ which was clearly supported
by the Indian Constitution, which did not privilege ‘industrious citizens’
and allowed state regulation and intervention in the larger interests of
development and democracy. This meant that regulation efforts initiated
by communists could not be easily attacked as majoritarian takeover.
The communist threat appeared daunting also because of the
international context, in which Christianity/Catholicism was being
threatened by communists in Eastern Europe.
 At the centre of controversy was the Kerala Education Act, 1958,
which according to its left supporters was a measure designed to bring
social justice into the largely-Christian controlled sector of school
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education (Leiten 1982). However the Hindu rightwing approved of
regulation efforts; sections of the Congress too were openly supportive
of the Bill, and used anti-minority language, exhorting the government
not to allow the State money contributed by Hindus, Muslims, and
Christians and other communities to be spent on spreading the religious
faiths of the minorities” (Leiten 1982: 47). The Communists were
prompted not by contextual reasoning in minority affairs that took into
account the national and international scenario – but by political
calculation in the immediate context. They aimed at extending the
state’s infrastructural network, and thereby undermining the Catholic
Church’s growing biopolitical network. The threat was massive, and it
was apparent that the self-representation of the community as an
industrious and law-abiding minority being persecuted was not
sufficient. The Kerala Land Reforms Bill added fuel to the fire and for
many the bill was the root cause of Liberation Struggle, though it was
fought explicitly on the Education Bill (Pulikunnel  2004: 10-12)
The Syrian Catholic elite actually overcame this crisis by a dual
strategy: by deploying the persecuted-minority argument, and
interestingly enough, by creating a majoritarian front against the
communists. The Education Bill was referred to the Supreme Court of
India for advise on whether it violated minority rights; the Court in its
ruling classified the disputed classes into three: those that violated
Article 30 (1) of the Constitution; those that are reasonable regulations
and fully permissible; and those permissible under the circumstances,
but appeared to be “perilously near violating” the right of administration
(Chander 1981: 84). While this seemed to vindicate some of the alarm
raised by the Catholics, it did not help their efforts to retain control over
the community-building network (Rajeswari 2005: 127). The
communists could not be accused on Hindu bias directly, but they were,
however, open to the charge of ‘Godlessness’: nine out of eleven ministers
in the first communist ministry had refused to take the name of god in
the oath of office (Rajeswari 2005: 75).
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The challenge was thus met by a violent majoritarian assault, the
infamous ‘Liberation Struggle’ which brought down the first Communist
government in 1959 : against the alleged ‘Godlessness’ of atheist
communists, and their numerous alleged attempts at ‘socialism’
undermining individual liberty and right to property (Chander 1981,
Leiten 1982, Rajeswari  2005). This allowed the Catholics to build
(albeit temporary) alliances with all sorts of religious fundamentalisms,
including the Hindu and Cold War fundamentalism in the US, which in
effect turned the issue into a confrontation between majoritarian ‘Faith’
against ‘Godlessness’,  atheism and rationalism, which were clearly
minority! (Rajeswari 2005) The Church has been also directly combative
about state-sponsored sex-education that may challenge Catholic dogma,
both in the 1960s and at present, and here again it works not as a minority
but as a brutal majority via alliance with the entire gamut of conservative
forces (Devika  2007, Rajeev 2007). Through the 20th century, right into
the present, such a majoritarian response has been characteristic of the
Church’s opposition to most of the state’s efforts to create spaces for
individuals and groups who may choose to exit from communities or
straddle them – and the history of such conservative alliance between
communities is almost as long as the history of their competition. In
1929, when the Travancore Legislature was discussing the Civil
Marriages Act, both the Nairs and the Catholics were united in their
opinion that such a move would bring only decadence and licentiousness
to society.16
It would be no exaggeration to say that in the early decades of the
20th century, the Christian and Muslim communities in Travancore
16 See report of Nair conference at Karuvatta, 4 May 1929; V. C. George,
‘Civil Vivaaham Sambandhiccha Jayabheri’, 16 April, 1929; R e p o r t
of protest by the All-Kerala Catholic Conference,  8 May 1929; report of
debate on Civil Marriages Act and its rejection at the Nair conference at
Changanashery, 2 May 1930 – all from Nazrani Deepika.
26
encountered ‘secularism’ – early attempts to separate religion from the
state – as a strategy of elite caste Hindus to consolidate their power over
emergent modern fields. The claims of the Dewan that he was merely
avoiding favours to particular religion rang hollow in the face of several
facts:  that Travancore was a self-professed ‘Hindu State’, that the Dewan
was himself a champion of Hindu communalism, that many of his measures
against ‘rank communalism’ brought significant, if indirect, gains to the
Hindu elite. Secularism as the clear separation of religion and state was
indeed not a possibility at all under the given circumstances; indeed, the
Travancore kingdom’s late 19th century efforts to shape a realm of modern
government had not produced secular spaces. Instead, a version of
developmentalism provided its ideological underpinnings, which did
not necessitate the renunciation of community identities. The Syrian
Christians, whose ‘initial conditions’ were such that the ideal of the
‘industrious and low-abiding citizen’ fitted them perfectly, bolstered their
advantage through the projection of Kerala’s traditional polity in which
Hindu kings were imagined to have extended equal tolerance to subjects
of all faiths especially when such subjects were ‘industrious and law-
abiding’. The Dewan’s final strike at the community was to attempt a
takeover of their community apparatus, which was perceived as a hostile
move initiated by the Hindu state. The Syrian Christian resistance to this
move implicitly accused the Dewan of breach of the moral bond between
Hindu ruler and industrious and law-abiding non-Hindu subjects. Their
claims were not just as a numerical or cultural minority, but as a group of
industrious wealth-producers -– and more importantly, as the most
important modernizing force in the kingdom – who had a moral right to
conditions under which they could flourish.
In the 1950s, however, the entire backdrop had changed. The Indian
Constitution had come into force. Community movements had declared
their willingness to work within the framework of the nation, renouncing
claims to formal political representation but vowing to stay active outside
to ensure that their members received full membership in the emergent
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nation. However, tensions were apparent, and suspicions whether
‘nationalism’ would deliver the promise of secularism were voiced actively
in the Christian press. ‘Secularism’ in these discussions clearly referred to
the restoration of entitlements and rights lost to the Christian community
during Sir C. P’s rule, such as the welfare entitlements of converted
Christians and the right to start schools (Deepika, editorial, 3 June 1949;
Chacko 1949, 1).17 The All-Kerala Catholic Congress officially abandoned
its political programme but announced that Catholic legislators of different
parties would work together to end ‘religious disabilities’, of which four
were identified as most important – disabilities in educational ventures
by Catholics, denial of free education to dalit Christians, the denial of
inheritance rights to converted Christians, and difficulties in establishing
churches and cemeteries (Deepika 15 June 1949, 2) –  some of these, for
instance the inheritance rights of converted Christians — had been
demanded much earlier (‘Mathabhethavum Avakashabhethavum’, 8
August 1896, in Mappila 1997).
 In general, from the Catholic view, two things appeared ominous:
one, the prospect of the state extending its infrastructural network was
quite real, however, given the hegemonic status of developmentalist-
socialist ideologies and the strength of the communist movement. Also,
the experience of the Catholic Church in East European countries under
communism conditioned the Church’s opposition to communism here.
Second, while the threat of Hindu majoritarianism could not be raised
against the communists in any direct sense, this threat still loomed in
the political field in the form of the Nair community and Ezhava elite.
The Education Act was perceived as a threat of takeover, this time not
from the Hindu but the developmentalist-socialist welfare state. The
earlier argument defense against government interference – that which
foregrounded the Syrian Christians’ contribution as industrious
17 Chacko, P.T. 1949. ‘Moothumuradiccha ‘Desheeyatvattil Ninnu’ (From an
Ossified ‘Nationalism’), Deepika 14 June 1949, p.1.
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producers and pioneering modernizers of the larger population – worked
much less now precisely because the communists’ commitment to  such
developmentalism was beyond doubt. And as the Supreme Court ruling’s
revealed, the secular Indian Constitution’s guarantee of minority rights did
not erode the developmentalist state’s power to extend its infrastructural
network. The solution then was to both claim lawful state protection as a
minority and erect a majoritarian front from which violent struggle
against the government, which slid into the unlawful, was launched.
In short, Syrian Christians in Kerala did not always pitch their
claims and demands to the state on the grounds of being a minority.
While they have sought to access the protection offered to minorities by
the Indian Constitution, from the Syrian Christian community politics
of the 1950s, it appears as though such protection was perceived as a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the community’s ‘flourishing’
in a society driven by capitalist competition among social groups
endowed with unequal resources. Nor has the community limited itself
to minority politics in any strict terms. At crucial moments, minority
politics seems to have transmogrified into majoritarian culturalist politics.
II
Indeed, the deployment of the lawful and the unlawful in securing
Syrian Christian interests took an interesting turn in the anti-eviction
struggles of the 1960s.  The discourse of the ‘industrious subject’, as
early as the 1930s, also prompted a move away from the state towards
the community and the church – in a context of mounting material
distress in the face of the depredations to small peasants in the Great
Depression, the rise in the Syrian Christian population, the food crisis
triggered by the stoppage of rice imports after the fall of Burma, and the
Dewan of Travancore’s repressive policies. This weakening of the state’s
biopolitics is evident in editorials in Christian newspapers that criticize
the community leaders’ concentration of energies in securing adequate
representation in public services and legislative bodies, and instead
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recommend that they take a lead in transforming members into
‘productive human beings’.18 In 1949, the Deepika paid an indirect
compliment to the Syrian Christians when it remarked that communities
which lack an ethic of work and enterprise are bound to remain
economically backward and this sows the seeds of communal competition
(Deepika 14 Sept 1949).19 This was already bearing fruit, in the active
encouragement of migration to Malabar, to other regions of India, and
to other countries by Syrian Christian Church and lay leadership.20
The late 1930s and 40s saw the intensification of material distress
among the poor in Travancore and with food shortage deepening, the
government allowed peasants to enter wastelands and forests as part of
the ‘Grow More Food’ campaign, with some technical restrictions, but
in practice, none. Cash and food crop cultivation in the risky, malarial
18 Deepika, editorial, ‘Samvidhaana Lakshyam’, 16 June 1941;
‘Samudayasanghatanakal’, 17 June 1941; ‘Samudayasanghatanakal’
(Community Movements), 14 Sept., 1949; ‘Thozil Cheyyanam’19 January
1949. Even as late as 1958, Deepika editorials disparaged the way in
which the Christians wasting their age and health by resorting to
government jobs for making their living, instead of establishing their
affluence through physical labour. Deepika editorial, ‘Catholica Congress’,
6 May 1958.
19 Also see the editorial of Malayala Manorama, “Krishi Parivarthanavum
Christian Missionarimarum”- I & II, 1-2 August 1950.
20 Dr. L.J. Chittoor (‘Kutiyettam’, 27 November 1960, Deepika) invoked
the Papal indoctrination that ‘wealth of the world is for all human beings’
and calls for the termination of all international regulations that disallow
people moving across the world and sharing its riches.  P.J. Thomas too
was an ardent supporter of migrations for making use of the abandoned
landscapes. See ‘Kutiyettam: Keralathinte Adiyanthira Aavashyam’, 15
August 1958, Deepika; ‘Brazil Kutiyettam: Prayogiga Vasangal’, 25
September 1958, Deepika; ‘Kutiyettam Sanghatithamayi Venam’, 11
November 1958, Deepika; ‘Janavardhana Thadayukayalla, Ulppadhanathe
Vardhippikkukayanu Vendathu—Dr. P. J. Thomas’, 7 April, 1938, Nazrani
Deepika. ‘Prakrithi Sambathinte Nadukku Pattiniyum
Thozhilillaymayum—P. J. Thomas’, 11 August, 1952, Mathrubhumi;
‘Madhya Pradeshathu Laksham Thiru-Kochi Kudumbangal Kutiyerunna
Karyam Planning Commission Aalochikkunnu’, 10 January 1956,
Deepika; See for a discussion Varghese 2009: 49-56.
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tracts of northeast Travancore spread rapidly, and by 1951, 98.1 per cent
of the total area available for cultivation in Travancore was occupied.
The lead was taken by Syrian Christian small peasants, who later began
to migrate to the ‘unoccupied’ areas of Malabar. Cultivation of
wastelands, in these years of intense want, was widely accepted as a
solution to the food crisis – it was hegemonic, shared by communists
and the Congress, the Catholic Church, and the Nair supreme, Mannath
Padmanabhan.21 That this venture by the Syrian Christian peasants was
closely supported by the Church points to the intensification of the
Church’s pastoral role in secular times and forms is unmistakable.22 The
migration to Malabar was analogous to the Israelites’ journey from slavery
to Egypt to the light of freedom in Canaan, as the head of the newly-
erected Syro-Malabar diocese of Malabar Mar Sebastian Valloppilly
(1954-89) liked to put it.23  In the period between the 1960s and 70s, the
Catholic Church in Kerala was quickly and firmly institutionalized
through an impressive network of wide-ranging institutions including
schools, hospitals, convents, livelihood training centres, prayer and
research centres, small-scale industries, charities, orphanages, and care
homes. Between 1965 and 1973, the Church was running 816
development projects throughout the State; 550 hospitals, had 840,000
students in its schools, and had received 32 million rupees as foreign
aid for development and charity work (Lemercinier and Houtart 1974:
323). This points to the growth and consolidation of an alternate source
21 Mannathu Padmanabhan, ‘Athmavisvasavum Swasrayasheelavum
Valarthuka’,  speech delivered in the Kothamangalam Karayogam meeting,
1928, in Mannathu Padmanabhante Prasangangal, pp. 5-7; ‘Kutiyeri
Parkkatha Samudayam Oridathum Orukalathum Nannavukayilla—
Mannam’, 18 May 1955, Deepika.
22 This included the efforts on the part of the church to provide objects of
modern secular development to the newly reclaimed areas and its
organising role in the anti-eviction struggles in Malabar (Valloppilly 1999:
352-62, Pazheparambil 1978: 143-53, 203-56; Kunnel 2000: 42-50, 54-
68). See for a detailed discussion Varghese 2006: 201-07, 236-69).
23 Mar Sebastian Valloppilly, “Avatharika,” to Pazheparambil 1978, pp. vii-x.
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of welfare and social governance, outside the state but nevertheless
powerful.
However, the migrants to Malabar and northeast Travancore were
often ‘beyond the law’ in that they were not often confirmed owners of
the land they cultivated and therefore vulnerable to eviction. Indeed,
the numerous anti-eviction struggles of the 1960s were all desperate
attempts to attain legal rights on the land by the migrant peasants. What
we see is a series of struggles by what may be called a Syrian Christian
‘political society’ – in Partha Chatterjee’s use of the term — clamouring
at the gates of the state for legal rights to their often-illegally occupied
land, supported by the church and the communists. The nature of the
eviction threat differed from instance to instance – at Udumbanchola in
Travancore (1961), the evacuation was from reservoir areas of the
proposed Idukki hydroelectric project; at Kottiyoor (1961) and Pulppally
(1967), the threat of eviction was from the government which sought to
evict peasant occupants from ‘illegally occupied’ temple-lands; at
Kakkadavu (in the 70s), it was eviction for a dam; at Gudalloor  (the 60s
till early 80s) the Tamil Nadu government sought to evict early migrants
who had occupied the land as part of the Grow More Food campaign in
the 40s for rehabilitating Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka; in Churuli-
Keerithode, it was eviction of occupants of forest lands; while Shimoga
in Karnataka witnessed eviction apparently for the same reason. The
struggles were mostly organized and conducted by the able figures in
the Catholic Church, with the active presence and support of communist
peasant organizations and immensely popular leaders like A K Gopalan
(Varghese 2006: 260-62). The Malanadu Karshaka Union was formed
for the evictees as an apolitical forum first, and later converted into a
political party, the Karshaka Tozhilaali Party, led by the firebrand
Catholic priest Joseph Vadakkan of the ‘Liberation Struggle’, who was
now working alongside the communists for the migrant peasants’ cause.
Most of these struggles were successful and farmers were granted
ownership and/or compensation, except at Shimoga, where the church
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took the lead in buying 500 acres of land in Kerala to distribute among
the displaced (Vallopilly 1999: 356-59, Kunnel 2000: 54-68, Valavoor
1995: 123-28).
What is also important and interesting about the anti-eviction
struggles is that here too, the question is rarely posed as a ‘minority
issue’. Indeed, the bulk of energy was spent on evoking the discourse of
hard labour and wealth-creation for the nation – industrious subjects
surfaces again, demanding a moral response from the state, projecting
themselves as a morally-superior group of people labouring to feed
their compatriots without thought of their own comfort. In the numerous
articles that appeared in the 40s and 50s commending migration in the
Syrian Christian press; these qualities are prescribed as absolute
necessities for people seeking to enter an inhospitable terrain. Besides
enterprise, industry, and endurance, the fourth quality demanded is a
moral one – non-attachment to comforts. This would crown the future
depictions of the ‘warriors against poverty’: “[T]hey did not want the
luxuries of city life. They came not with guns and swords but with
spades and axes. Terrible forests and valleys were their battlefield.”24
This alone was sufficient; it seemed, to demand a moral response from
the state, evident in a farmer’s answer to a question on the threat of
eviction in Shimoga:  “[I] have nothing to say. I came here to live by
hard work. If that is something wrong, the government may evict me.”
Bishop Valloppily assured prospective evictees: “[N]othing to fear if
you can work hard.”25 Besides, it was argued, the migrants produced
food for their brethren – and hence authors call for the recognition of the
migrants as “national assets”. Indeed the failure of the welfare state to
24 K.C. Ninan, ‘Manninodu Mallidan Vannu’, 23 March 1954, Deepika.
25 Nechikkad, ‘Mysore- Kuthichuyarunna Shimoga Colonikal’, Girideepam,
Vol. 5, Issue. 10, April 1966, pp. 7-9, 27; Mar Sebastian Valloppilly,
‘Kutiyettam: Chila Charithra Smaranakal’, in Kutiyettathinte Ithihasam,
pp. 18-20.
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provide succour to the poor and the hungry is frequently pointed out
and the courage of the migrant peasant who took it upon himself as a
“self-assumed national obligation” is saluted (Sivaswamy 1945).26 Many
an article of these times in the Syrian Catholic journals pleads for
humanitarian considerations in such matters, arguing that migrants were
driven by sheer want and lack and not out of greed. E.M.S. Nambutiripad
actually summed up this attitude during the anti-eviction satyagraha at
Amaravati in the early 60s (in which A K Gopalan went on a 12-day
fast), condemning the eviction attempts and stressing that the issue was
both “a humanitarian problem, and a nationalistic one as well.”27 The
discourse of humanitarianism was a powerful tool used by the migrants
and their supporters, which annoyed people like K. Kelappan, Sarvodaya
leader and nationalist, who were staunch critics of the egalitarian
developmentist model. He strongly advocated eviction of Syrian
Christian migrants occupying temple and forest lands. He was irritated
by the fact that no action had been taken no the ‘encroachers’ as the
government fears the ‘humanitarianists’. (K. Kelappan, ‘Bhumi
Kaiyettavum Kudiyirakkum,’ 16 September 1961 and
‘Vanasamrakshanam Karyakshamam Akkanam,’ 11 October 1961,
Mathrubhumi)
26 The mission of the migrant was to “save the country from starvation
deaths.” See for such representations in the contemporary media, Varkey
M. Maruthanamkuzhy, ‘Wayanattil Chennal Kanjivellam Kutichu
Marikkam’, 19 April 1950, Deepika; ‘Malabarinte Aiswaryam Vardhichathu
Kutiyettakkarude Aagamanathodukuti’, 13 February 1950, Deepika; O.V.
Lukose, ‘Keralathile Nandanodyayamayi Highrangine Roopanthara-
peduthanam’, 13 December 1956, Deepika; ‘Malabarile Colonikal’, 26
March 1962, Malayala Manorama;  ‘Malabarile Malayorangalil-I :
Thiruvitamkur Kutiyettakkar, Oru Mukhavura,’ 17 March 1961,
Maththrubhumi.
27 Namboodiripad, ‘Amaravathi Prasnam Deshiya Prasnam Kootiyanu’ and
‘A. K. G. yude Jeevan Kondu Panthadaruthu’, speeches in Kerala
Legislative Assembly on June 14th and 16th 1961 respectively, in EMSinte
Sampoorna Kritikal Vol. 28, pp. 114-23.
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The communist defense of the migrant occupant was also pivoted
on precisely egalitarian developmentalism. The communist leader N. E.
Balaram wrote about Kottiyoor : “[T]ill recently the region was full of
wild forests…Today that region as a whole heaves with beautiful
agricultural gardens…All the necessities of life except salt are being
produced there. Annually, according to one estimate, crops worth more
than a crore of rupees are being produced…”28 The importance of such
narratives in mobilizing strong support for ‘illegal’ migrants even among
seemingly-implacable political foes cannot be discounted.
Most of the anti-eviction struggles met with a fair degree of success
– in each case, the state’s favourable response was a reciprocation to the
moral appeal of the ‘industrious peasant’ (Varghese 2007: 521-22). The
Hindu rightwing accusations that foregrounded the community
affiliations of the peasant were not really successful. This ‘secular
outcome’ – it could well be argued that the state’s decision, in this case,
was one that based on contextual reasoning. However, the massive
alienation of tribal lands was the flip-side of these gains, especially on
areas like Wayanad, where lands were taken away by the migrants through
a whole range of thoroughly unfair means (Sreekumar and Parayil 2002).
M.A. Oommen points out that after the land reforms, tribal populations
in areas that were once tribal-majority area declined at alarming rates –
in Attappady, for example, 61 per cent of the population was tribal in
1961; this fell to 37 per cent in 1981 (Oommen 1993: 10).
The tribals are of course a minority directly protected by the Indian
Constitution – but the reluctance of both the left and the right to create
conditions under which this ethnic and developmental minority may
assure at least its survival in Kerala is striking indeed (Varghese 2006:
295-97). Certainly, the Syrian Christian migrants could not draw upon
28. N. E. Balaram, ‘Kottiyoor Kutiyanmare N.S.Sinu Vendi Kuruthi
Kodukkaruthu’, (Leaflet by Kannur District Karshaka Sangham, published
in 1961), p. 1.
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Hindu support in this case. In fact in certain struggles like at Pulppally
and Shimoga, the Church was vociferous about the role of the Hindu
fundamentalist organizations; 29 also, the Christian political elite and
even sections of the Church were more than reluctant in extending
wholehearted support to the anti-eviction struggles, worried as they
were about the impact it would have on the majoritarian alliance that
had been created during the Liberation Struggle (Vallopilly 1999:
353-54; Vadakkan 1974: 147-48).  However their struggles rode on
hegemonic developmentalist ideologies, which seemed to assure that
‘industrious wealth-producers’ deserve greater citizenship than others
who do not conform to this ideal. Just how pervasive this ideology was
within the community is revealed by a report on development initiatives
of the Church published in 1974. The authors, Lemercinier and Houtart
notice that the dominant understanding of ‘development’ within Catholic
institutions they studies was elitist.  To quote them:
The whole model is built up as though a hierarchical
structure pre-existed, in which men would stand either on
their own merits or those of their ancestors…It also seems
to consider the underdeveloped people not as victims of
a system, but as a group guilty (with all the weight of the
moral judgement implied) of not having been able to
integrate themselves in social development, whereas
others (including project promoters) were able to achieve
this performance by their work.
    (Lemercinier and Houtart 1974: 80)
Indeed, this alleged superiority has even prompted self-
representations as ‘bringers of civilization’ to tribal areas, who rid the
tribal people of ‘superstition’, a claim supported by both the Church
29. Pazheparambil, 1978: 149; ‘Pulpalliyile Kutiyettakkar’, Girideepam, Vol.7,
Issue. 2, Aug, 1967; Varghese 2006: 245-46,252, 267-68.
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and others. 30  On the strength of such ideology, the ‘political society’ of
the migrants were able to mobilize a range of political forces to support
them and put moral pressure upon successive governments to grant
them legal ownership, disempowering in the process a minority which
had lawful claims to protection by the state. The fate of the ‘Kerala
Scheduled Tribes (Restriction on Transfer of Land and Restoration of
Alienated Lands) Act’ of 1975  — legislation that would have brought
to the tribals Indian Constitution-guaranteed protection – is indeed
revealing of the extent to which equally powerful, if opposing, interests
in Malayalee politics have been won over by the migrants (Varghese
2006: 295-98). As far as the tribals (who were peripheral to the hegemonic
reach of Malayali developmentalism) are concerned, the victory of the
migrant represented nothing less than a majoritarian assault on the very
sources of their survival.
Conclusion
Syrian Christians are undoubtedly one of the most prominent
among the success stories of minority groups in South Asia. Here our
effort has been to closely follow the specific political-ideological
strategies deployed by the community elites at crucial moments of crisis
and conflict to secure its interests. What appears striking is the fact that
at their successful overcoming of some of the most crucial moments of
crisis, their major strategies were not the accessing of minority rights –
moral or formal – or religious identity, in any simple sense.
30 See, Fr. Vadakkan, ‘Mattam Vithacha Van Kutiyettam’, in St. Joseph’s
Church Vayattuparambu, Smaranika,  pp. 54-55; P.C. Balakrishnan
Nambiar, ‘Wayanad Kutiyettathinu Sesham’, Girideepam special issue,
December 1966, pp. 46-47; Fr. Kunnel, ‘Anthar Samsthana Kutiyettam
Oru Adiyanthira Avasyam’, Girideepam, Vol. 5, Issue. 6, December 1965,
pp. 21-23; Jose Kadukayil, ‘Valarunna Colonikal—Nadavayal’,
Girideepam, Vol. 9, Issue. 10, April 1970, pp. 13-15; O.V. Lukose,
‘Keralathinte Nandanodhyanamayi Highrangine Roopappeduthanam’, 13
December 1956, Deepika.
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Certainly, the first possibility – the simple accessing of minority
rights — was closely explored in the battles of the late 50s; we have
argued that for the Church, this was a necessary but not sufficient
condition for community flourishing under given circumstances. We
also feel that Syrian Christian religiosity should not be lumped with
Syrian Christian community politics in any simple sense. It would be
absurd to claim that Syrian Christian religiosity was strictly rationalized
and instrumentalized to the end of community assertion – witness for
instance the devotional cults around St. George and more recently, St.
Alphonsa – which in fact happens to be far more hybrid, complex, and
syncretistic – indeed quite different from what one may expect in a
scenario of deepening community politics (Dempsey 2001). If in the
earlier half of the 20th century, there were successful efforts to nationalize
the upper-caste Hindu festival of Onam (through the successful rewriting
of the myth around Onam – through projecting the Asura king Maveli
banished by Vishnu as the benevolent welfare state), though it formally
became the national festival of Kerala only in 1961, and to secularize
Christmas, to some extent, the latter half of the 20th century has seen the
rise of new forms of religiosity in Kerala, ranging from the massive temple-
festival of Attukal in Thiruvananthapuram, to the sprouting of several
prayer-groups and new Churches among Christians. While these
developments are yet to be studied adequately, it may be premature to
conclude that the rise of religiosities has led to rise in tensions between
communities. State regulation of major pilgrimages and temples, while
under constant criticism of the Hindu rightwing, has survived; the major
communal conflagration at Marad, it may be argued, was as much or more
about resources, than about religious differences (Zacharias and Devika
2006). Christian new Churches have been under attack not only by the
Hindu right wing; the Catholic Church itself has been hostile to them.
Indeed, what is also striking is the manner in which the many
fragments – denominations – of the Syrian Christians managed to avoid
merger through all these community assertions. It is also interesting to
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note that the early 1880s witnessed the formation of an elite association
namely Syrian Christian Jathiaikya Sangham (initiated by a Syrian
Catholic priest and a Jacobite bishop). But ‘Syrian Christian’ as a single
and unitary category remained a dream for its founders. However, without
having an institutional framework of a single Syrian Christian category,
they could imagine themselves as single, especially when it comes to
their relationship with the Latin Christians. They could work together
for their political ends too as Syrian Christians, still keeping the Latins
outside (the Malabar migration was often seen as an opportunity to
reclaim the region from the Latin Christians) (Varghese 2006: 168-224).
Indeed, popular folklore claims that the motto of the Syrian Christians –
and of their political front, the Kerala Congress – is ‘the more we divide,
the more we thrive’ (pilarumthorum valarum).
However, of recently this dichotomy of Syrian/Latin too is played
down for a larger Christian identity. Interestingly, there has been a greater
recourse to minority rights in the present context, despite the fact that in
the recent contests particularly between the Syrian Catholic Church
and the communist government of Kerala (2006-2008), both the ‘anti-
atheistic’ stance and the ‘minority-rights-protection’ argument have been
evoked (Devika 2008, Krishnakumar 2007), and successfully.  This is
probably because it is being pointed out that the Church’s network now
is not so much biopolitical, as more commercial: at the core of the
contest with the state are not primary schools but self-financing
institutions of higher and technical education (Joseph Pulikkunel,
quoted in Krishnakumar 2007). Secondly, prominent dissenting voices
raised the issue of the use of the minority community protection-clauses
to defend the commercial ventures of individuals connected to the
Church – who happen to be priests. And sections of the Latin Catholic
laity accused the clergy of cornering minority rights – small but vocal
protests, which however helped to undermine the Church’s claims to
represent the community. The recourse to minority rights at the present
moment of crisis probably hints the loss of moral weight – as modernizers
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and producers of ‘industry’. Indeed Bishop Mar Powathil, at the height
of the crisis argued that resistance to government’s alleged efforts at
excessive control was a “matter of survival” as a minority (Krishnakumar
2007b).
 While avoiding strict homogenizing of community or religious
identity, the Syrian Christian elite employed both secular and non-
secular, both minoritarian and majoritarian, strategies in their goal, ‘to
thrive and flourish’ (a goal which was itself both religious and secular,
and in an indivisible way). Many battles, specifically against
Travancore’s Hindu-chauvinist Dewan Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyer, and
the anti-eviction struggles of the 1960s by the Syrian Catholic migrant
‘political society’, both made use of the hegemonic ideology of
developmentalism, albeit in distinct ways – of these, the first was a
‘lawful’ struggle, and the other was an ‘unlawful’ one. Hegemonic
developmentalist moralizing, however, activated the smooth
transformation of the ‘unlawful’ to the ‘lawful’. This in fact allowed the
destruction of the livelihoods and resources of the tribal people, a
‘developmental minority’ for who the assertion of the reigning
developmentalist logic in redistributive politics was majoritarian assault.
Another major conflict was with the communists in the 1950s, over the
attempts of the latter to extend the state’s infrastructural network which
would have destabilized internal hierarchies and control structures of
the community. Here, while ‘lawful’ minority rights were accessed, a
strategy that effectively mobilized the force of majoritarian culturalist
politics and deployed violent means which slid into the ‘unlawful’ to
secure the specific end.
 These strategies probably point back to the uneven socio-political
field driven by the imperative to accumulate productive resources in
which community politics took shape and made their competitive claims
in Kerala – a field that seems to have evolved before Independence and
continues to evolve. In such a field, the protection offered to minorities
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by the state can at best ensure, perhaps, their survival. But when
‘flourishing’ is understood as the unlimited utilization of resources for
the production of wealth and its symbols, other strategies may be found
necessary. And this, by no means, has been unique to the Syrian
Christians alone in Kerala. As Lemercinier and Houtart remark, the ideas
and patterns of community emancipation in the Catholic Church
involved three elements: one, the display of external signs of prestige
(large buildings, socially prestigious institutions), second, an elitist
pattern of social mobility that is also intensely individualist; and third,
nothing beyond charity for the really poor. The Church idea of social
well being contained the following aspects: “accent on individual
promotion, high status of non-manual work, insistence on private
property as the basis of economic organization, ideology of development
as resulting from individual effort and work.” This, they observe “have
been quite similar to those of other communities”. (Lemercinier and
Houtart 1974: 333-34). No less a representative of “other [powerful]
communities” than Mannath Padmanabhan had endorsed precisely these
ideals some two decades back – only that even then, the model that he
pointed to for the Nairs to emulate was that of the enterprising Syrian
Christian. But as the present crisis reveals this was no permanent self-
representation. What we have tried to probe are, indeed, a whole array of
intersecting images and affinities, which are invoked according to
circumstances; and through diverse performative assertions,
consciousness of shared community at different levels are created. And
besides, the many levels of Christian/Catholic religious faith and ardour
do not seem to be easily reducible to community interests – a theme that
requires fresh investigation.
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